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 The author argues that cultural diversity and religious 
pluralism present formidable challenges to the mission of the 
Church, and he situates his discussion in the context of Asia. 
He discusses the anthropological concept of culture and offers 
a critique of this concept in the light of globalization and the 
new communication technologies. Phan presents the Chinese 
Rites Controversy as a historical example of the concern for 
inculturation and dialogue. Finally, he highlights ways in 
which inculturation and interreligious dialogue can together 
further the mission of the Church in the multi-cultural and 
multi-religious context of Asia.
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 Cultural diversity and religious pluralism are often associated together in 
theological discourse on the contemporary challenges to the Church’s mission. 
Conceptually, however, they refer of course to different realities. Cultural diver-
sity connotes the co-existence of many and different cultures in a particular 
location, whereas religious pluralism refers not only to religious diversity – that 
is, the simultaneous presence of several, at times mutually exclusive and even 
mutually hostile, religions in one and the same location – but also, and more 
importantly, to the heightened consciousness, ever more widespread since 
modernity, of the necessarily relational and historically embedded character of 
all exclusive and absolute claims, including religious ones, a feature that seems 
to render such exclusive and absolute claims problematic if not impossible.
 Cultural diversity and religious pluralism do not necessarily go hand 
in hand. Indeed, whether both are present simultaneously or whether one is 
present without the other yields four possible scenarios:
 • A geographical area may be culturally diverse but not religiously 
  pluralistic. Europe has different cultures within it but is 
  basically Christian, at least in the past, when Christendom 
  prevailed. A great part of the Middle East is culturally diverse 
  but finds religious homogeneity in Islam.
 • A country may be culturally homogeneous but religiously 
  pluralistic. China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and many other 
  Asian countries come to mind. Each of these has a largely 
  common culture and several competing religions.
 • Some countries are homogeneous both culturally and 
  religiously, such as Thailand (Thai culture and Buddhism) 
  and the United States of America in the recent past (Anglo-
  Saxon culture and Christianity).
 • Today, however, thanks to globalization and immigration, 
  most, if not all, countries are becoming increasingly pluralistic, 
  both culturally and religiously. This is one of the most signifi
  cant signs of the time that presents enormous challenges to the 
  Church.
 In addition, cultural diversity and religious pluralism have grown expo-
nentially within Christianity itself in recent times. One of the most striking reli-
gious phenomena in the post-colonial era of the 20th century is the emergence 
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of Christianity as a world religion. Karl Rahner (190–1984) has famously 
remarked that at the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) the Roman Catholic 
Church began to be truly a “world church.” The German Catholic theologian’s 
observation proves no less true of other Christian denominations. What has 
transpired in Christianity is that while it has ceased to be a dominant religious 
and socio-political force in the West, and while religious attendance has dimin-
ished precipitously there, the number of Christians has grown by leaps and 
bounds and the vitality of Christianity is extraordinary in other continents. 
In addition, the Western form of Christianity that had been exported to the 
so-called Third World since the 16th century has been transformed, sometimes 
beyond recognition, by the local churches. A new Christianity that may be 
termed “world Christianity” is aborning. In summary form, the following data 
about Christianity as a world religion can be observed:
 • In world population, there has been a demographic explosion 
  in the Third World, whereas there has been a zero or even 
  negative growth in the First World. This demographic 
  explosion in the Third World, where Christianity is expanding 
  rapidly, brings with it a vast number of problems on a global 
  scale, and Christians will have a key role in resolving them.
 • In Christianity, there has been a demographic shift from the 
  north to the south. In 1950, some 80% of the world’s Christian 
  population lived in the northern hemisphere (Europe and 
  North America). It is projected that by 2025, three-fourths 
  of Christians will live in the southern hemisphere (Asia, Africa, 
  and Latin America). This shift in the center of gravity implies 
  a growing importance of Third-World Christians in 
  determining the future direction of Christianity.
 • In general, the Third World is economically poor, politically 
  unstable and undemocratic, socially conservative, and 
  religiously diverse. Inevitably, Christians of the Third World 
  will have to practice their faith under these limiting conditions 
  and their faith expressions will inevitably reflect them.
 • Christianity, currently estimated at two billion, is the largest 
  and fastest-growing world religion. Its strongest competitor is 
  Islam. But the resurgence of Buddhism and Hinduism also 
  poses a challenge to Christianity. This rivalry, whether pursued 
  or not, will have vast implications in many areas of society.
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 • Christianity is the most diverse and pluralist religion. This 
  diversity is most visible in the southern hemisphere. Well over 
  2,000 of the world’s languages are used in Bible translation, 
  liturgy, worship, and theology. Moreover, southern Christianity 
  incorporates into its faith expressions elements from the local 
  cultures and customs such as ancestor worship, initiation rites, 
  marriage and funeral practices, popular devotions, music, 
  and dance, which Christians of the First World may find 
  quaint, repugnant, and even superstitious. On the other hand, 
  some practices in the First-world Church such as the episcopal 
  ordination of a practicing gay, the blessing of same-sex 
  marriages, or the ordination of women have met with 
  vociferous condemnations by some Third-world Church 
  leaders.
 • The spectacular growth and dynamic presence of Pentecostal 
  Christianity in the Third World represents a severe challenge 
  to mainline churches, with its emphasis on the literalist reading 
  of the Bible, miraculous healing, prophesying, exorcism, 
  glossalia, and ethical rigorism. For good or for ill, this brand 
  of Christianity has found a deep resonance with Third-World 
  people and its success requires a careful study in determining 
  the future shape of Christianity.
 • Another significant feature of Christianity as a world 
  religion is the emergence of a great number of Christian 
  independent churches (e.g., African Independent Churches)   
  and new religious movements that are Christian-inspired 
  but are not recognized as such by the Christian mainline 
  churches (e.g., the Unification Church founded by Rev. Sun 
  Myung Moon). These churches have attracted a large number 
  of followers and raise challenging questions regarding the 
  nature, the structure, and the leadership style of Christianity.
 • Thanks to globalization and widespread migration, the 
  presence of Third-world Christians in the First World is 
  growing rapidly, bringing with them different forms of 
  Christianity. Also, some Christian denominations such as 
  the Roman Catholic Church have imported Third-World 
  clergy to remedy the priest shortage. Furthermore, missionaries 
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  are coming from southern Christianity to evangelize the West, 
  so that there is talk of a reverse mission.
 In sum, both from without and within the Church, cultural diversity 
and religious pluralism present formidable challenges to the Church’s mission. 
It is often stated that cultural diversity calls for inculturation, whereas religious 
pluralism demands interreligious dialogue. But can and should these two activ-
ities be carried out apart from one another? Are inculturation and interreligious 
dialogue distinct, as culture and religion are often taken to be distinct? Indeed, 
are culture and religion really two distinct human realities, and if so how? If 
they are not distinct, at least in certain areas, how is the Church’s mission to 
be carried out? In what follows, I will first briefly consider the relationship 
between culture and religion, with special reference to the Asian context. Next, 
I will present a historical example of inculturation and interreligious dialogue 
in Asia to illustrate the relationship between culture and religion. In light of 
this relationship, I will conclude with reflections on the mission of the Church 
in the multi-cultural and multi-religious context of Asia.
Culture and Religion in the Asian Context
 There are as many definitions of culture and religion as there are scholars 
defining them. For our purposes, it would be helpful to begin with definitions 
commonly accepted in Western academy, and then show whether or not they 
are applicable to the Asian context.
Culture
 In recent anthropology, whether functionalist, structuralist, or 
symbolic, culture is commonly taken to mean a human construction or conven-
tion, universally present but diversified according to social groups, composed 
of various elements such as language, beliefs and values, social mores and insti-
tutions, rituals and symbols, and sundry artifacts into which the members of 
the group are socialized and according to which they pattern their way of life.
The Anthropological Concept of Culture
 This anthropological usage of culture, which emerged in the 1920s 
and predominated in the US, highlights its socially constructed nature, its 
group-differentiating function, its holistic character, and its context-dependent 
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development.1 As opposed to what is “nature” and “animal,” culture is the 
product of human creativity and the defining hallmark of being human. At the 
same time, culture, itself a human convention, forms and shapes the way its 
creators live and interact with each other and constitutes them into a separate 
group, distinct from other groups with their own cultures. Thus, culture sets up 
identity-marking ways of life for the group, characterizing observant members 
as good citizens and transgressors as deviants. Culture in this sense, as distinct 
from the social behaviors, is conceived as an integrated and integrating whole. 
The constituent elements of this whole are seen as functionally interrelated 
to each other because they are perceived to express an overarching meaning 
system, to be mutually consistent, to operate according to certain common 
laws or structures, or to maintain and promote the stability of the social order. 
Lastly, because culture is a human product, it evolves and changes, but always 
dependent on the context of the group. To understand a particular cultural 
practice, then, one must place it in relation with the other elements of culture, 
even cross-culturally, and analyze all the relevant elements in a synchronic 
manner.
 An important feature of the anthropological approach to culture is its 
non-evaluative posture. Unlike the proponents of the elitist notion of civiliza-
tion with its uniform and universally binding ideal, or of Kultur with its claim 
to intellectual, artistic, and spiritual nobility, or of high culture as the principle 
of social reform and the standard for individual self-discipline, cultural anthro-
pologists look upon cultures (note the plural!) – including local and popular 
customs – as self-contained, clearly bounded, internally consistent, and fully 
functioning systems. Consequently, they successfully eschew ethnocentrism, 
concentrating on an accurate description of a particular culture, rather than 
judging it according to some presumed norms of truth, goodness, and beauty.2
The modern anthropological concept of culture has its own advantages. As 
Robert Schreiter has noted, the concept of culture as an integrated system of 
1. For a history of the concept of culture, see Alfred A. Koeber and Klyde Kluckhohn, 
 Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, MA: Papers of the 
 Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1952). For 
 a brief overview, see Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology 
 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 3–24. Tanner surveys the meaning of “culture” as it was used 
 in France, Germany, and Great Britain before its current usage in anthropology. For a 
 presentation of Vatican II’s understanding of culture and its development, including John 
 Paul II’s notion of culture, see Michael Paul Gallagher, Clashing Symbols: An Introduction 
 to Faith & Culture (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 36–55.
2. For development of this concept of culture, see Tanner, Theories of Culture, 25–37.
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beliefs, values, and behavioral norms has much to commend it. Among other 
things, it promotes holism and a fragmentation of mass society; is congenial to 
the harmonizing, and way of thinking prevalent in oral cultures; and serves as 
an antidote to the corrosive effects of modernity and capitalism.3
The Postmodern Critique
 In recent years, however, this modern anthropological concept of culture 
has been subjected to a searing critique.4 The view of culture as a self-contained 
and clearly bounded whole, as an internally consistent and integrated system 
of beliefs, values, and behavioral norms that functions as the ordering principle 
of a social group and into which its members are socialized, has been shown to 
be based on unjustified assumptions.5 Against this understanding of culture, it 
has been argued that:
 • it focuses exclusively on culture as a finished product and 
  therefore pays insufficient attention to culture as a historical 
  process;
 • its view of culture as a consistent whole is dictated more by the 
  anthropologist’s aesthetic need and the demand for synthesis 
  than by the lived reality of culture itself;
 • its emphasis on consensus as the process of cultural formation 
  obfuscates the reality of culture as a site of struggle and 
  contention;
 • its view of culture as a principle of social order belittles the role 
  of the members of a social group as cultural agents;
 • this view of culture privileges the stable elements of culture and 
3. See Robert Schreiter, The New Catholicity: Theology Between the Global and the Local 
 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 49–50.
4. For the following reflections on the postmodern concept of culture, see Peter C. Phan, 
 “Religion and Culture: Their Places as Academic Disciplines in the University,” in The Future 
 of Religions in the 21st Century, edited by Peter Ng (Hong Kong: Centre for the Study of 
 Religion and Chinese Society, 2001), 321–53.
5. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1977); James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press, 1988); George Marcus and Michael Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural 
 Critique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Toward a 
 New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: 
 Routledge, 1994); Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process (London: Sage, 
 1994); and Mike Featherstone, Undoing Modernity: Globalization, Postmodernism and 
 Identity (London: Sage, 1995).
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  does not take into adequate account its innate tendency to 
  change and innovate; and
 • its insistence on clear boundaries for cultural identity is no 
  longer necessary since it is widely acknowledged today that 
  change, conflict, and contradiction are resident within culture 
  itself and are not simply caused by outside disruption and 
  dissension.6
 Rather than as a sharply demarcated, self-contained, homogeneous, 
and integrated whole, culture today is seen as “a ground of contest in relations”7 
and as a historically evolving, fragmented, inconsistent, conflicted, constructed, 
ever-shifting, and porous social reality. In this contest of relations, the role of 
power in the shaping of cultural identity is of paramount importance, a factor 
that the modern concept of culture largely ignores. In the past, anthropologists 
tended to regard culture as an innocent set of conventions rather than a reality 
of conflict in which the colonizers, the powerful, the wealthy, the victors, the 
dominant can obliterate the beliefs and values of the colonized, the weak, the 
poor, the vanquished, the subjugated. This role of power is, as Michel Foucault 
and other masters of suspicion have argued, central in the formation of knowl-
edge in general.8 In the formation of cultural identity, the role of power is even 
more extensive, since it is constituted by groups of people with conflicting 
interests, and the winners can dictate their cultural terms to the losers.
 This predicament of culture is exacerbated by the process of globaliza-
tion in which the ideals of modernity and technological reason are extended 
throughout the world (globalization as extension), aided and abetted by a 
single economic system (i.e., neoliberal capitalism) and new communication 
6. For detailed articulations of these six objections against the anthropological concept of 
 culture, see Tanner, Theories of Culture, 40–56.
7. The phrase is from Schreiter, The New Catholicity, 54.
8. See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith 
 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, translated 
 by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Press, 1975); Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
 Selected Essays and Interviews, edited by Donald Bouchard and translated by Donald 
 Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977); Power/Knowledge 
 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987); Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the 
 Age of Reason, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988); Politics, 
 Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman and 
 translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Routledge, 1988); and Critique and Power: 
 Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
 Press, 1994).
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technologies.9 In globalization, geographical boundaries, which at one time 
helped define cultural identity, have now collapsed . Even our sense of time 
is largely compressed, with the present predominating and the dividing line 
between past and future becoming ever more blurred (globalization as compres-
sion). In this process of globalization, a homogenized culture is created, consol-
idated by a “hyperculture” based on consumption, especially of goods exported 
from the USA, such as clothing (e.g., T-shirts, denim jeans, athletic shoes), 
food (e.g., McDonald’s and Coca Cola), and entertainment (e.g., films, video, 
and music).
 Such a globalized culture is not, however, accepted by local cultures, 
hook, line and sinker. Between the global and the local cultures there takes 
place a continuous struggle, the former for political and economic dominance, 
the latter for survival and integrity. Because of the powerful attraction of the 
global culture, especially for the young, local cultures often feel threatened by it, 
but they are far from powerless. To counteract its influence, they have devised 
several strategies of resistance, subversion, compromise, and appropriation.10
 Like the anthropological concept of culture as a unified whole, the 
globalized concept of culture as a ground of contest in relations has its own 
strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, it takes into account features 
of culture that are left in the shadow by its predecessor. While recognizing that 
harmony and wholeness remain ideals, it views culture in its lived reality of 
fragmentation, conflict, and ephemerality. Cultural meanings are not simply 
9. For a discussion of the historical development of globalization, see the works of Immanuel 
 Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
 European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic, 1974), and 
 The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European 
 World-Economy, 1600–1750 (New York: Academic, 1980); Anthony Giddens, Modernity 
 and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University 
 Press, 1991); and Ronald Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 
 (London: Sage, 1992). In general, Wallerstein attributes an exclusively economic origin to 
 globalization, while Giddens sees it rooted in four factors, namely, the nation-state system, 
 the world military order, the world capitalist economy, and the international division of 
 labor; Robertson highlights the cultural factors in globalization.
10. For a brief discussion of globalization, see Schreiter, The New Catholicity, 4–14. Social 
 scientist Arjun Appadurai lists five factors that have contributed to the “deterritorialization” 
 of contemporary culture: “ethnoscape” (the constant flow of persons such as immigrants, 
 refugees, tourists, guest workers, exiles), “technoscape” (mechanical and informational 
 technologies), “finanscape” (flow of money through currency markets, national stock ex
 changes, commodity speculation), “mediascape” (newspapers, magazines, TV, films), and 
 “ideoscape” (key ideas such as freedom, welfare, human rights, independence, democracy). 
 See Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy,” Public Culture 
 2/2 (1990): 1–24.
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discovered ready-made but are constructed and produced in the violent caul-
dron of asymmetrical power relations. It recognizes the important role of power 
in the formation of cultural identity. Furthermore, it sees culture as a historical 
process, intrinsically mutable, but without an a priori, clearly defined telos and 
a controllable and predictable synthesis. On the debit side, this postmodern 
concept of culture runs the risk of fomenting fundamentalistic tendencies, 
cultural and social ghettoization, and romantic retreat to an idealized past.11
Religion
 Perhaps more than culture, religion has been the subject of endless 
definitions. It is neither feasible nor necessary to review all of them here. Suffice 
it to note that today, after the work of Mircea Eliade, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
and Clifford Geertz, it is safe to say that reductionist approaches to religion 
such as those of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Sigmund Freud, present 
religion as simply an economic alienation, a social function of the sacred, 
or an obsessional neurosis. These are largely rejected today, even though it is 
acknowledged that religion cannot be fully understood apart from economics, 
social structures, and individual personality. Furthermore, the goal of arriving 
at a comprehensive and universally valid theory of religion, as proposed by 
early anthropologists such as Edward B. Tylor, James Frazer, and Mircea Eliade, 
has been abandoned as unrealistic. In its place, it is suggested that one perform 
“thick descriptions” of concrete and local cases, à la Evans-Pritchard and 
Geertz.12
 For the purposes of this essay, Geertz’s cultural or symbolic interpre-
tation of religion is particularly relevant. According to Geertz’s oft-quoted 
description, religion as a “cultural system” is:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions 
11. On these three tendencies or cultural logics dubbed as antiglobalism, ethnification, and 
 primitivism, see Schreiter, The New Catholicity, 21–25. For a lucid exposition and critique 
 of postmodernism, see Dale T. Irvin, “Christianity in the Modern World: Facing 
 Postmodern Culture and Religious Pluralism,” in The Future of Religions in the 21st 
 Century, edited by Peter Ng (Hong Kong: Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese 
 Society, 2001), 253–66. For Irvin, postmodernism is liable to three temptations: facile 
 acceptance of the processes of consumerism and commodification, disdain for tradition and 
 memory, and reduction of the historical past to its Western cultural form.
12. On various theories of religion, see Daniel L. Pals, Seven Theories of Religion (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1996), and Irving M. Zeitlin, The Religious Experience: Classical 
 Philosophical and Social Theories (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004).
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of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such 
an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic13 
 By “a system of symbols” Geertz means just anything that conveys 
an idea to people. For a systematic presentation of religious symbols, Ninian 
Smart’s categorization is helpful. They may belong to one of the following 
dimensions, though of course not all religions possess them to the same 
degree: (1) the practical and ritual, (2) the experiential and emotional, (3) the 
doctrinal and philosophical, (4) the ethical and legal, (5) the social and insti-
tutional, and (7) the material.14 Geertz himself tends to reduce these symbols 
to two categories: “moods and motivations” (ethos) and “conceptions of a 
general order of existence” (world view), though his ethnographic studies of 
religion paid little attention to the latter.
 Finally, what is specific about religion as a cultural system is that, 
according to Geertz, its symbols, in contrast to other symbols, claim to put its 
followers in contact with what seems to be “really real.” The general concep-
tions of religion are clothed “with such an aura of factuality that the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely real.”
Culture and Religion: Theories of Their Relationship
 Clifford Geertz’s description of religion as a “system of symbols,” albeit 
of a unique kind, and his interpretation of religion as a “cultural system” already 
intimate the deep connection between religion and culture. It would be helpful 
now to spell out the relation between these two realities and examine whether 
such a relation has been exhibited in Asia, and if so, how.
 With the disappearance of Christendom and with the emergence of 
modernity, many European countries and the United States have adopted the 
principle of non-establishment of religion. While the intent of this principle 
is to prevent the establishment of a state religion and to guarantee religious 
freedom, one of its unintended effects is the privatization of religion and its 
separation from culture. Separation of church and state is widely taken to mean 
erecting an impenetrable wall between religion and culture. At worst, religion 
13. Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
 90.
14. See Ninian Smart, The World’s Religions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 
 12–21.
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is tolerated as a private pursuit; at best, it is relegated to being one among many 
functions of public life though not permitted to influence its economic, polit-
ical, and moral dimensions
 Two theological reactions to this modern trend have been adopted. 
Common to both is the rejection of the marginalization of religion from the 
public square. The first, taken by, e.g., American evangelical Christians, is to 
reclaim the Christian control of culture and society, especially in the fields of 
education, the judiciary, and public policies. Culture is to be thoroughly imbued 
with Christian ideals and norms. In the words of the Pledge of Allegiance, the 
United States of America is one nation “under God” – God taken to refer to the 
God of Christianity.
 The second approach is not to claim a special province for religion 
alongside with other areas of human life such as ethics, epistemology, and 
aesthetics but to argue for its pervasive presence in culture. To rescue religion 
from irrelevance and to restore its rightful position in culture, the second 
approach presents religion as the intrinsic dimension of culture. One of the 
most famous proponents of this approach is Paul Tillich (1886–1965), whose 
articulation of the relationship between culture and religion is captured in his 
celebrated dictum: “Religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form 
of religion.”15 Taking religion to mean being grasped by the ultimate concern, 
Tillich uses another metaphor, that of “depth” or “ground,” to describe its rela-
tion to culture: “It (religion) is at home everywhere, namely, in the depth of 
all functions of man’s spiritual life. Religion is the dimension of depth in all of 
them. Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit.”16
Culture and Religion in Asia
 How the relationship between culture and religion is understood in 
Asia is extremely complex and varied, as varied and complex as the political 
arrangement between religion/church and state in Asian countries. In some, a 
particular religion is a state religion, e.g., Islam in Pakistan, though religious 
freedom is recognized. In others, a religion, though not a state establishment, 
is so prevalent (e.g., Buddhism in Cambodia and Thailand, and Christianity in 
the Philippines) that it is practically equivalent to it. In others, such as China 
and Vietnam, religious freedom is constitutionally guaranteed, though in prac-
tice organized religion is barely tolerated and at times even persecuted. In still 
15. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 42.
16. Ibid., 7.
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others, e.g., Indonesia, the constitution explicitly recognizes the belief in God 
(one of the five principles of pancasila), but does not establish any religion. 
Finally, some countries, such as India, adopt an explicitly secular constitution.
 While the relation between church and state can be stated in precise 
legal terms, that between religion and culture is much more fluid and elusive. 
Linguistically, most Asian languages do not have words formally equivalent to 
the English word “religion.” Dharma and dao, which often serve as translations 
of “religion,” are not the formal nor even dynamic equivalents of the Western 
notion of religion, even in the rather expansive Geertzian description of it as 
a “system of symbols.” Furthermore, while Asian religious traditions possess 
many, perhaps even all, of the seven dimensions Ninian Smart attributes to 
religion in general, the fact that they are referred to in the West as isms, e.g., 
Buddhism and Hinduism, already tilts the balance toward the doctrinal and 
institutional elements, at the expense of the other dimensions which in fact may 
hold a more preponderant role than doctrine and organization. Substantively, 
it has been said, and with reason, that most Asian religions or religious tradi-
tions are, not unlike Christianity, ways of life, and in this sense, they cannot be 
distinguished, much less separated, from culture.
 Culture means not so much what is humanly constructed as opposed 
to “nature,” as civilization or Kultur or “high culture.” Rather culture or, better 
still, a cultured person, to use the Confucian notion of junzi, often translated 
as the “superior man,” is someone who has not only achieved a notable formal 
education but also has fulfilled all the moral and religious obligations toward 
heaven, society, and family.
 Thus, in spite of the fact that the political model of separation of church 
and state has been adopted in many Asian countries, the relation between reli-
gion and culture remains one of vital symbiosis and mutual interaction rather 
than of clear-cut distinction, much less downright opposition.
Religion and Culture in Asia: A Test Case
 Perhaps one of the best ways to clarify this type of relationship between 
religion and culture in Asia is to revisit the so-called “Chinese Rites Controversy” 
which began in 1645 and ended in 1939. My intention is neither to retell the 
twists and turns of this three-century long dispute nor to discuss the under-
lying theological and liturgical issues. Rather, I will use this dispute to illumine 
the relationship between culture and religion and to draw the implications as 
well as the challenges this kind of relationship poses to the Church’s mission in 
Asia.
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 As the participants in the Chinese Rites Controversy saw it, the 
neuralgic issue was whether the cult of Confucius and the ancestors, with its 
bodily gestures (e.g., the kowtow) and its rituals (e.g., the offering of foods and 
flowers; the burning of incense, candles and paper money; the use of funerary 
tablets; and various funeral practices) was superstitious or theologically neutral 
acts. In general, the Jesuits (though not all), following Matteo Ricci, viewed 
the cult of Confucius and the ancestors as theologically unobjectionable and 
therefore permissible. On the contrary, other missionaries, mostly Dominicans, 
Franciscans, and the members of the Paris Foreign Mission Society (especially 
Charles Maigrot) condemned the cult as idolatry and superstition. Popes 
Clement XI (Ex illa die of 1715) and Benedict XIV (Ex quo singulari of 1742) 
forbade the practice of the Chinese Rites under pain of excommunication, 
required all missionaries to China to take an oath of obedience, and prohibited 
further discussion of the issue.
 The language in which the debate concerning the Chinese Rites was 
couched is that of religious worship. Indeed, the issue was prejudicially settled 
by the Dominican Juan Baptista Morales, an ardent opponent of the Jesuits’ 
accommodationist policies, when he used Christian terminology to describe 
the cult of Confucius and the ancestors in the 17th questions he addressed to 
the Propaganda Fide in 1643. The religious character of the Chinese Rites was 
implied in words such as altare, sacrificium, genuflectio, templum, and sacerdos.
 In the decree of 1645, the Holy Office condemned the Chinese Rites 
as presented by Morales. However, the Holy Office also made an extremely 
significant distinction in its answer to Morales’s 12th question as to whether 
it is permissible for “Christians and especially ministers of the Holy Gospel” 
to “genuflect” and prostrate themselves in front of the “decorated altar” on 
which the tablet of the deceased was placed and “to carry candles and incense 
to burn on the altar.” The Holy Office states: “This can be tolerated as long as 
the table is an ordinary piece of furniture and not a true altar, and if the actions 
performed are within the bounds of political compliance.”17 Again, in 1704, 
the Holy Office declared that its answers were “not opposed to other things 
being performed in honor of the dead if they are in keeping with the culture 
of these pagans, if they are not really superstitious, and not look superstitious 
17. 100 Roman Documents Concerning the Chinese Rites Controversy (1645–1941), translated 
 by Donald F. St. Sure, edited with introductions and summaries by Ray R. Noll (San 
 Francisco: University of San Francisco, 1992), 4.
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but are within the limits of civil and political rites.”18 The all-important phrase 
“intra limites obsequii civilis et politici” (within the bounds of political compli-
ance) – which evinces the Holy Office’s awareness of the distinction between 
religion and culture – would be used again and again as a decisive criterion for 
determining the acceptability of a particular practice in over 100 documents 
related to the Chinese Rites in the course of 300 years.
 The term “political” – used in 1645 for the first time in the ecclesiastical 
documents concerning the Chinese Rites – describes acts that would normally 
be considered as belonging to social customs such as the bowing of the head and 
prostration of the body, though its modern meaning referring to politics and 
the state would be more frequent in later Church documents. In contemporary 
parlance, the fundamental criterion for the tolerance or condemnation of the 
Chinese Rites is whether they belong to ‘culture’ or “religion.” It is to be noted 
that for both those who permitted and those who condemned the Chinese 
Rites, the distinction between acts of “religion” and acts that are merely “civil 
and political” is undisputed. Furthermore, for both groups, the distinction can 
in principle be made with certainty and perhaps even with ease. The only issue 
to settle is whether the Chinese Rites are the former or the latter.
How and who can best decide this question? The missionaries, the political 
authorities, or the ordinary people? Certainly, missionaries did express their 
opinions, after a study of the Chinese classics and their commentaries, or by 
means of personal observation of the rites, or through interviews with the 
Chinese themselves. Their drastically different judgment of the character of the 
Chinese Rites – theologically neutral customs or superstition and idolatry – was 
no doubt colored by rivalries among religious orders and political allegiances 
to the padroado (patronage) system, but it was above all deeply rooted in their 
theology of non-Christian and even non-Western practices.
 Political authorities, too, were consulted and their declarations were 
taken seriously by Church authorities, particularly in the 1930s, and these 
official statements did sway Roman authorities toward permitting the Chinese 
Rites. In 1700, Emperor K’ang Hsi agreed with the statement of four Jesuits 
of Beijing that “it is not true that he (Confucius) is worshiped in order to seek 
wisdom or to pray for official rank or salary” and that “performance of the 
ceremony of the sacrifice to the dead is a means of showing sincere affection 
for members of the family and thankful devotion to ancestors of the clan.”19 
18. 100 Roman Documents, 22.
19. George Minamiki, Chinese Rites Controversy from Its Beginning to Modern Times 
 (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), 41.
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Two hundred and thirty years later, in 1932, after some students of Sophia 
University in Tokyo refused to bow in front of the Yasukumi Shrine in honor 
of the dead soldiers, the Ministry of Education, in response to Archbishop 
Jean Alexis Chambon’s question whether the “inclination of the head has a 
patriotic and in no way a religious meaning,” declared that “the bow has no 
other purpose than that of manifesting the sentiments of patriotism and loyal-
ty.”20 Finally, in 1935, as the Japanese Kwantung army was attempting to make 
Confucianism, called the Wangtao (the Royal Way), the basis for the national 
unity of the puppet state of Manchukuo, and as Chinese Catholics refused to 
participate in the cult of Confucius, the Ministry of Education stated, once 
again, in a letter to Archbishop Augustin Ernest Gaspais that “the ceremonies 
in honor of Confucius have as their sole objective the exterior manifestation of 
the veneration which we have for him, but they do not have at all any religious 
character.”21
 This basic distinction between acts of religious nature and acts of civil 
and political significance serves as the decisive criterion for the Propaganda 
Fide’s policy of tolerance of the Chinese Rites with the approval of Pope Pius 
XII (Plane compertum est of 1939):
It is abundantly clear that in the regions of the Orient some ceremonies, 
although they may have been involved with pagan rites in ancient times, have 
– with the changes in customs and thinking over the course of centuries – 
retained merely the civil significance of piety towards the ancestors or of love 
of the fatherland or of courtesy towards one’s neighbor.22
Culture Diversity and Religious Pluralism: 
Challenges to the Mission of the Church in Asia
 Given the distinction between culture and religion as a heuristic prin-
ciple operative in ecclesiastical documents, and given the vast changes in the 
postmodern concepts of culture and religion, the question naturally arises as 
to how the Church’s mission is to be carried out in Asia, where, as we have 
seen above, culture and religion exist in vital symbiosis and mutual interac-
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cultural diversity and interreligious dialogue for religious pluralism. Abundant 
official Church documents, promulgated by both Roman authorities and the 
Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences, explain the theological principles 
of inculturation and interreligious dialogue and recommend practical steps to 
be taken in these two activities. However, in so doing, very few, if any, official 
documents have taken into account the challenges posed by the postmodern 
concept of culture and the lack of a clear distinction, let alone separation, 
between culture and religion in Asia. As a result, inculturation and interreligious 
dialogue are often understood to be two distinct activities that can somehow 
be performed separately. Inculturation without interreligious dialogue lacks 
depth and runs the risk of elitism and archeological aestheticism. Interreligious 
dialogue without inculturation suffers from sectarianism and runs the risk of 
irrelevance. To put it in Tillichian terms, inculturation without interreligious 
dialogue lacks “substance”; interreligious dialogue without inculturation is 
deprived of “form.” The concluding section of this essay will highlight some 
of the ways in which inculturation and interreligious dialogue can together 
and in tandem further the Church’s mission in Asia, in light of what has been 
said about the ever-growing phenomenon of cultural diversity and religious 
pluralism, about culture as “a ground of contest in relations,” and about the 
interpenetration between culture and religion.
 Firstly, since culture is becoming less an integrated and integrating 
whole and more a historically evolving, fragmented, conflicted, ever-shifting, 
and porous social reality, inculturation cannot and must not be undertaken 
apart from the task of liberation and human development. The same thing 
must be said about interreligious dialogue. Inculturation and interreligious 
dialogue without liberation remain mostly an intellectual exercise that perpet-
uates cultural and religious oppression. In light of this, it has been argued 
that dialogue with Indian cultures and religions must not be limited to the 
culture of the upper castes and the scriptures and rituals of Hinduism but 
must also attend to the marginalized voices and the sufferings of the Dalits and 
the tribals. Similarly, it has been pointed out that in countries such as China, 
Vietnam, Korea, and Japan, interreligious dialogue must be carried out not 
only with the “great religions” such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism 
but also with the so-called “minor” religious traditions such as indigenous and 
traditional religions.
 Secondly, as has been noted above, thanks to globalization and immi-
gration, many if not all Asian countries, which were at one time homogenous 
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culturally and religiously, are becoming increasingly pluralistic, both cultur-
ally and religiously. Obviously, this pluralistic context vastly complicates the 
dynamics and process of inculturation and interreligious dialogue. A set of 
issues has gained greater urgency and has come to the forefront of theological 
discourse. In inculturation, cultural diversity raises the question of which and 
whose culture has the right to sit at the table of the dialogue. In interreligious 
dialogue, religious pluralism severely challenges the possibility of making abso-
lute and exclusive claims about a particular savior and/or religious community. 
While such claims need not be eliminated as an a priori condition of possibility 
for interreligious dialogue, a new epistemology and hermeneutics for inter-
preting these claims need to be elaborated and applied so that interreligious 
dialogue may be fruitful and mutually enriching.
 Thirdly, the fact that in Asia culture and religion exist in vital symbi-
osis and mutual interpenetration, questions the validity and usefulness of the 
common practice of separating – at least theoretically, and sometimes in prac-
tice – the two activities of inculturation and interreligious dialogue. Such sepa-
ration is predicated upon the distinction between acts of religion and “civil and 
political acts.” Such distinction, it may be recalled, was a useful heuristic device 
for the Catholic Church to permit the Chinese Rites. However, it is important 
to note the historical context in which this distinction arose. As mentioned 
above, the distinction was first made by the Holy Office in its 1645 answer to 
Juan Baptista Morales’s 12th question. The distinction was also implicit in the 
Beijing Jesuits’ memorandum to Emperor K’ang Hsi regarding the nature of 
the rites in honor of Confucius and the ancestors. Again, the distinction was 
accepted as well in the 1932 and 1935 declarations of the Japanese Ministry 
of Education that certain gestures and rituals in the cult of Confucius and 
the ancestors, which had been judged by a group of missionaries in China to 
possess a religious character, have only a cultural and political significance.
 It is essential to note that these two declarations of the Japanese 
Ministry of Education, which had an enormous impact on the Roman author-
ities’ decision to change their policy regarding the Chinese Rites, were made 
with an explicit political aim of providing a basis for national unification. 
The Meiji government was interested in divesting the religious character of 
Shintoism to make it acceptable to all Japanese of diverse religious persuasions, 
and the Japanese Kwantung army was concerned with making Confucianism a 
common basis for the unity of the puppet state of Manchukuo.
 Given the political use of the distinction between culture and reli-
gion, it is vital to question its usefulness for the project of inculturation and 
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interreligious dialogue in Asia today. Two points need to be borne in mind in 
this regard. First, as most Asian countries do not build their political unity 
on the basis of a common religion, there is no longer the need to void certain 
rituals of their religious character in order to make them acceptable to those 
whose religious traditions do not accept them. Secondly, there is a serious 
temptation (at least for Christians) in inculturation and interreligious dialogue 
to empty the specifically religious content of the doctrines, moral practices, 
monastic traditions, and rituals and regard them as merely cultural, theolog-
ically neutral artifacts in order to “baptize them” for Christian use. In this 
way, interreligious dialogue is made much less arduous, since the partners in 
dialogue would not be forced to confront religious differences in their religious 
specificity. But the price is unacceptably high. Take the cult of ancestors as an 
example. If it is made into a “civil and political” act, it is easy for the Church to 
tolerate it, but the cult is thereby emptied of its innermost meaning for those 
who still practice it as one of the most sacred acts of their religious traditions. 
At the same time, an opportunity is lost for Christians to reconsider in the light 
of this cult their theologies of grace, mediation, communion and veneration of 
saints, and intercessory prayer, just to mention a few.
 Cultural diversity and religious pluralism, which are increasingly 
becoming the hallmarks of contemporary society, present enormous challenges 
to the Church’s mission. A postmodern understanding of culture as a “ground 
of contest in relations” and the blurring of the boundaries between culture 
and religion and hence the practical impossibility to distinguish with certainty 
between what is merely cultural and what is strictly religious, make the tasks of 
inculturation and interreligious dialogue much more complicated than official 
Church documents and even contemporary theologies make them out to be.
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